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DOES PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING DISTORT DEMOCRACY? A
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES
Martin H. Malint
l.

INTRODUCTION

Almost three decades after the Wagner Act guaranteed most private
sector employees in the United States the right to organize and bargain
collectively, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the City of Muskegon's prohibition on any city police officer being a
member of a labor union. 1 Although it is now settled that such restrictions
are unconstitutional,2 collective bargaining by public employees remains
highly controversial in the United States. For many decades, some states
have prohibited public employee collective bargaining by statute. 3 The
controversy flared in 2011 most visibly in Wisconsin, which, over the
largest protest demonstrations seen in that state since the Vietnam War,
largely eliminated collective bargaining for all public employees except
most law enforcement and firefighters and some transit workers, and in
Ohio where the public rejected by referendum amendments passed by the
legislature and signed by the governor that would have severely restricted
public employee bargaining rights. The controversy, however, was not
confined to those very visible states. Major legislation eliminating or
severely restricting public employee collective bargaining was enacted in
numerous other states including Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
and Tennessee. In 2012, legislation was introduced in Arizona and South

t Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Stephen Befort,
Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Ann Hodges, Cesar Rosado Marz.an, Paul Secunda, and Joseph Slater;
and financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. Local 201, AFSCME v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W. 197 (Mich. 1963).
2. See AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F.
Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (3-judge district court).
3. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-98 (West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2. (West
2002).
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Dakota that would prohibit voluntary recognition of unions by units of local
governrnent. 4
Among the attacks against public employee collective bargaining is the
contention that it distorts democracy. Traditionally, this attack has argued
that decisions over public employees' wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment inherently raise issues of public policy, and
collective bargaining mandates that one interest group, workers and their
unions, have an avenue of access that is not available to any other interest
group. Collective bargaining, the argument goes, may preempt other
interest groups from being heard on such policy issues. Even where this
argument has not led to a complete prohibition on collective bargaining, it
has led to restrictions on the scope of bargaining. In essence, this argument
urges that workers and their unions should have to compete against all other
interest groups in the broader political process in attempting to persuade
public decision makers to resolve workplace issues in workers' favor.
The attacks in 2011, however, raised a new argument. Many attacking
the legitimacy of public employee collective bargaining have argued that
collective bargaining distorts democracy by inappropriately advantaging
public employee unions in the broader political process. According to these
arguments, confining workers and their unions to the broader political
process is not sufficient to maintain democratic processes; rather unions
must be stripped of their inappropriate advantages by prohibiting unions
and employers from agreeing to allow union members to pay their dues
through payroll deduction (dues check oft) and from requiring employees
represented by t.he union who are not union members to pay a fee for their
representation (agency-shop or fair-share fees).
This Article considers these dual attacks on the legitimacy of public
employee collective bargaining. Part II examines the claim that collective
bargaining distorts democracy by conferring an exclusive avenue of access
on one privileged interest group, thereby preempting the broader political
process. Part III examines the claim that public employee collective
bargaining inappropriately adva~tages workers and their unions in the
broader political process.

/.

4. Az. S.S. 1485 (2012) would have prohibited public employers from •'recogniz[ingJ any union

as a bargaining agent of any public officer or employee," or even meeting and conferring with any union
for pwposes of "discussing or reaching any employment bargain," and would have authorized any

taxpayer to sue to enforce the prohibition. The bill's final disposition is listed as "Held awaiting
Committee of Whole." SB1485 Bill Status Overview, http://www.azJeg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?
inDOC'"'/1egtext/50leg12r/bills/sbl485o.asp&Session_ID=I07 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). S.D. H.B.
1261 would have prohibited all public employee collective bargaining in that state. It was unanimously
tabled in the House CommerCe and Energy Committee. http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/Bill.aspx?
·
Bill=1261 (last visited Sept . .?5, 2012).
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THE TRADITIONAL A TTACK: PREEMPTION OF THE BROADER
POLITICAL PROCESS

Public sector collective bargaining in the United States greatly
increased in the 1960s and 70s. In 1955, public sector unions had about
400,000 members; by the 1970s that number had increased to more than 4
million. 5 Not surprisingly, the dramatic increase attracted considerable
academic attention. Among the leading theorists of public sector collective
bargaining were Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter, Jr., and Clyde
Summers. Wellington and Winter and Summers shared a common starting
point of analysis. They urged that unlike collective bargaining in the
private sector, which is primarily an economic process, collective
bargaining in the public sector is primarily a political process. As such, it
poses a danger of distorting basic democratic processes because it gives one
interest group, public employees and their unions, an avenue of access that
is unavailable to other interest groups and may, as a practical matter,
preempt the voices of competing interest groups. Summers expressed the
concern as follows:
Collective bargaining significantly changes the role of public
employees in the budget-making process .... The first crucial change is
that ... the majority union becomes the exclusive representative of all
employees in the bargaining unit .... Dissonance or indifference in the
employee group is submerged, giving the employees' voice increased

clarity and force.
The second, and more crucial, change is that a responsible public
official must bargain in good faith until either an agreement or impasse

is reached. This means that a public official representing the city must
deal with the union face-to-face and at length. Granting an interview,
listening to a presentation or even engaging in discussion-the normal

courtesy given by public officials to other interest groups-is not
enough. When the union presents its demands, the public official or his
representative must respond, not with evasive ambiguities or
noncommittal generalities, but with hard answers . ...
The third, and perhaps most important, change is that collective
bargaining provides the union a closed two-sided process within what is
otherwise an open multi-sided process. Other groups interested in the
size or allocation of the budget are not present during negotiations and
often are not even aware of the proposals being discussed. Their
concerns are not articulated and their countervailing political pressures

are not felt except by proxy through the city's representative at the
bargaining table. 6

5. See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN c. HODGES &JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPWYMENT:
CASES AND MA TE RIALS 229 (2d ed. 2011 }.
6. Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Polilicol Perspective, 83 YALE. L.J.
1156. 1164 (1974).

\
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Wellington and Winter expressed similar concerns over the impact of
public employee collective bargaining on the political process:
Collective bargaining by public employees and the political process
cannot be separated. The costs of such bargaining, therefore, cannot be
fully measured wi thou! taking into account the impact on the allocation
of political power in the typical municipality. If one assumes, as here,
that municipal political process should be structured to ensure a high
probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can
make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of
decision, then the issue is how powerful unions will be in the typical
municipal political process if a full transplant of collective bargaining is
carried out.
The conclusion is that such a transplant would, in many cases,
institutionalize the power of public employee unions in a way that would
leave competing groups in the political process at a permanent and
substantial disadvantage ... .1

Neither Summers nor Wellington and Winter regarded their concerns
as justifying a prohibition on public employee collective bargaining.
Rather, they cautioned that private sector labor law doctrine should not be
transplanted wholesale to the public sector. They agreed that the scope of
bargaining in the public sector should be narrower than in the private sector
and disagreed over the implications of their concerns for the right to strike
in public employment. Others, however, have urged that what they see as
the distorting effects of public employee collective bargaining on
democratic processes should lead to a complete prohibition on such
bargaining. 8
The U.S. Supreme Court has been agnostic in this debate as a matter of
constitutional law. The Court has rejected arguments that exclusive
representation offends the constitutional rights of free expression or free
association of parties excluded from the forum, 9 but has also held that there
is no constitutional right to be represented by a union, even as an individual
in a public employer's unilaterally established grievance procedure. 10 The
common reasoning is that although individuals have a right of free speech,
they do not have a right to compel the government to listen; the government
may decide who it wishes to consult and who it wishes to shun.
State courts, however, have been influenced strongly by the concern
that collective bargaining by public employees may distort the political
process. Enactment of the Virginia statute prohibiting public sector
7.

HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., TuE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 29-30 {1974)

(quotation marks and footnote omitted}.

8. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes
Democracy, Gov'r UNION REV. Winter 1980, at 5.
9. Minn. State Bd. for Comty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
10. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps. Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
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collective bargaining was preceded by the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington County, in which
the court held that units of local government lacked authority to enter into
collective bargaining agreements. 11 At issue before the court was whether
the authority to recognize unions and bargain collectively with them was
implied in a county's and a school district's express authority to manage
their jurisdictions' affairs and make contracts for services. 12 In addressing
this question, the court characterized the collective bargaining process as in
tension with democratic principles. 13
fTlhere can be no question that the two boards involved in this case, by
their policies and agreements, not only have seriously restricted the

rights of individual employees to be heard but also have granted to labor
unions a substantial voice in the boards' ultimate right of decision in

important matters affecting both the public employer-employee
relationship and the public duties imposed by law upon the boards. 14
As noted above, neither Summers nor Wellington and Winter believed
that their perceived tensions between public employee collective bargaining
and democratic processes warranted prohibiting bargaining. Wellington
and Winter identified four arguments for collective bargaining in the private
sector: that it reduces workplace conflict by developing a common
understanding of firm and industry conditions by management and labor,
that it furthers workplace democracy by providing a vehicle of worker voice
in workplace governance, that it facilitates worker organization and
participation in the public political arena, and that it equalizes inherently
unequal bargaining power. 15 They maintained that the first three arguments
applied to the public sector but questioned the need for collective
representation to equalize bargaining power. 16 They distinguished the costs
of equalization of bargaining power in the two sectors, observing that in the
private sector the costs are economic whereas in the public sector they are
political and less constraining on the union.11 They urged that the lesser
need to equalize bargaining power coupled with the effect that mandating
collective bargaining had in excluding other interested groups from the
decision-making process should drive determination of the scope of
bargaining in the public sector. 18

11. 232 S.E.2d 30 (Va. 1977).
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id. at 39.
14. Id. For a history of the treatment of public sector collective bargaining in Virginia., see Ann C.
Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum,
18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y 735 (2009).
15. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8-9.
16. Id. at 12-14.
17. Id. at 14-24.
18. Id. at ch. 9.
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Summers regarded the antidemocratic tendencies of public sector
collective bargaining as justified because public employees will often be
outnumbered in the broader political process by the general public which
will demand greater levels of service at lower prices. 19 He urged that
bargaining be required only on those subjects on which the workers'
interests are in clear direct confrontation with the unified interests of the
public at large. With respect to other subjects, public employee unions
should be left to make their case in the broader political and policy debate. 20
The caution urged by Summers and Wellington and Winter against
importing the private sector approach to the scope of bargaining has been
picked up by the states. For example, in Unified School District No. I of
Racine County v. WERC, 21 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly
rejected the private sector test for determining whether a matter is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining:
In the private sector, collective bargaining is limited by the need to
protect the "core of entrepreneurial control," particularly power over the

deployment of capital. If resources are to be employed efficiently in a
market economy, capital must be mobile and responsive to market
forces . ...
Different concerns are present in the public sector, however . ... In

the public sector, the principal limit on the scope of collective

bargaining is concern for the integrity of political processes. 22

The court continued:
Where a decision is essentially concerned with public policy choices,
no group should act as an exclusive representative; discussions should

be open; and public policy should be shaped through the regular political
process. Es-sential control over the management of the school district's

affairs must be left with the school board, the body elected to be
responsible for those affairs under state law. 23

The court concluded that whether a matter is a mandatory subject of
bargaining depends on:
whether a particular decision is primarily related to the wages, hours and
conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarily

related to the formulation or management of public policy. Where the
governmental or policy dimensions of a decision predominate, the
matter is properly reserved to decision by the representatives of the

people.24

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Summers,supranote8,at 1165-68.
/dat1192-97.
259N.W.2d 724(Wis. 1977).
Id at 730.
Id at 730-31.
Id. at 731-32.

------~------
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Concern with preempting other interest groups from the decisionmaking process has led to numerous state court decisions finding matters
that would clearly be mandatory subjects of bargaining in the private sector
to be merely permissive or even prohibited subjects in the public sector. In
City of Broolfzeld v. WERC, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an
economically motivated decision to lay off firefighters was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining, characterizing it as "a matter primarily related to the
exercise of municipal powers and responsibilities and the integrity of the
political processes of municipal government. " 25 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that a proposal requiring just cause for discipline and
discharge was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 26 These decisions,
like most state scope-of-bargaining decisions, left whether to bargain up to
the employer. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals went further and
held that school calendar and employee reclassifications were prohibited
subjects of bargaining, reasoning:
Local [school] boards are state agencies, and, as such, are responsible to
other appropriate state officials and to the public at large. Unlike private
sector employers, local boards must respond to the community's needs.
Public school employees are but one of many groups in the community
attempting to shape educational policy by exerting influence on local
boards. To the extent that school employees can force boards to submit
matters of educational policy to an arbitrator, the employees can distort
the democratic process by increasing their influence at the expense of
these other groups. 27
Like Maryland, New Jersey also prohibits bargaining over subjects it
determines to fall outside the scope of mandatory bargaining, reasoning that
"the very foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if
decisions on significant matters of governmental policy were left to the
process of collective negotiation, where citizen participation is
precluded. '" 8
State courts have made determination of the scope of bargaining in the
public sector tum on an ad hoc balancing of workers' democratic rights to a
voice in their terms and conditions of employment against the public's
democratic right of participation in governmental decision making. As
aptly described by the Iowa Supreme Court, "[T]he balancing test requires
courts to balance the apples of employee rights against the oranges of
employer rights. No court has been able to successfully advance a

25. 215 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1979).
26. Appeal of City of Concord, 651A.2d944 (N.H. 1994).
21- Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980, 987 (Md. 1987) (citation
omitted).
28. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 393 A.2d 278, 287 (N.J. 1978);
see also Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W. 2d 837 (S.D. 1974).
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convincing formula for determining how many employee rights apples it
takes to equal an employer rights orange."29 As the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals conceded, "Any attempt to define with precision and certainty the
subjects about which bargaining is mandated . . . is doomed to
failure .... " 30
The stakes in this ad hoc balancing of competing interests are large. If
a matter is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, an employer has no
obligation to provide the union with information relevant to the matter. 31
With respect to a matter that is not a mandatory subject, an employer may
bypass the union completely and pick its favored employees from whom to
seek input. 32
Elsewhere, I have argued that this approach to the scope of bargaining
in the public sector is counterproductive. I have shown how it impedes
positive labor-management cooperation by encouraging legal battles over
rights and power. 33 I have also urged that the flaw in the evolution of the
law governing public employee collective representation has been its
adoption of the private sector model that recognizes a significant regime of
employee rights with respect to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
while leaving all other matters to the unilateral control of management. I
have maintained that such a dichotomy excludes worker voice from
decisions that go to the basic delivery of public services and channels
worker voice to gaining protections from the effects of such decisions
unilaterally made by management. I have suggested that it is not surprising
that when so channeled, unions have succeeded in impeding the effective
and efficient delivery of public services. For example, a union excluded
from having a voice in establishing and implementing standards for
evaluating teachers will, not surprisingly, use all means at its disposal to
protect its teacher members from management's unilateral imposition and
enforcement of those standards. But, when the union has a voice in
developing and implementing evaluation standards, as in school districts
that employ peer review, the union's role changes to include protection of
the professional standards it helped to develop. I have called for
experimentation in the public sector to impose duties on employers to

29. Waterloo Educ. Ass'n v. Iowa PERB, 740 N.W.2d418, 424 (Iowa 2007).
30. City of Lynn v. Mass. Labor Relations Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Mass. App. Ct.
1977).
31. See, e.g.• Viii. of Franklin Park v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
32. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighers Ass'n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 728
(Tex. App. 1999).
33. See Martin H. Malin, Public Sector Labor Law Doctrine and Labor Management Cooperation,
in GoING PUBLIC:

THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN DELIVERING QUALITY

GoVERNMENT SERVICES 267 (Jonathan Brock & David Lipsky eds., 2003).
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provide meaningful voice to their workers in a broad range of decisions
beyond traditional collective bargaining. 34
The wave of legislation following the 2010 elections that I have
elsewhere called the tsunami that hit public sector collective bargaining35
has eschewed finding creative approaches to worker voice that preserve
both workplace democracy and public democracy and instead has greatly
increased the scope of unilateral employer control. Oklahoma repealed
collective bargaining rights for employees of mid-sized municipalities,36
and Tennessee did the same for teachers. 37 Wisconsin stripped state
university faculty, all employees of the University of Wisconsin Hospitals
and Clinics, and daycare and home healthcare providers of collective
bargaining rights. 38 Nevada took bargaining rights away from doctors,
lawyers, and some supervisors. 39
States also significantly restricted the scope of bargaining for public
employees. Wisconsin now prohibits bargaining on any subject other than
"base wages," which expressly excludes overtime, premium pay, merit pay,
performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay progressions. 4 Furthermore,
base wages may not increase more than the increase in the consumer price
index (CPI) as of 180 days before the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement. 41 In many respects, Oklahoma employees have more collective

°

34, See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369 (2009);
Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible
Marriage or //legitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL •y 885 (2007).
35. Manin H. Malin, The Tsunami that Hit Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. &
EMP.POL'Y I. 531 (2012).
36. H.B. 1593, 53d leg., lst Sess. (Okla. 201 I), www.oklegislature.gov/BiJJinfo.aspx?
Bill=HBIS93&Tab=().
37. PublicChapterNo. 738(Tenn.2011).
38. 2011 Wis. Act IO§§ 265 (state university faculty); 279 (U.W. Hospitals and Clinics), 280 (day
and home health care providers).
39. S.B. 98, §§ 5, 6, 16th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT.§ 288.140 (2011)).
40. 2011 Wis.Actl0§3l4.
41. Id. On March 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
upheld the constitutionality of the restricted scope of bargaining against attacks by a coalition of unions.
The unions argued that Act I O's disparate treatment of most public employees, on the one hand, and
security employees on the other, lacked a rational basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and distinguished between employees whose unions had supported Wisconsin
Governor Scott Walker in the 2010 election and those who opposed him, in violation of the First
Amendment. The court did find two other provisions of Act IO unconstitutional. The court found that
provisions of Act l 0 which prohibired voluntary pa)TOll deduction of union dues for all employees
except security employees lacked a rational basis and, thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause and the
requirement that unions representing bargaining units other than security employees submit to annual
recertification elections violated those unions' and their members' Equal Protection and Free Speech
rights. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012). On September 14,
2012, the Circuit Court for Dane County held Act IO's changes to the Municipal Employment Relations
Act prohibiting bargaining on all subjects other than base wages, dues check-off, and fair share fees, and
requiring annual recertification elections invalid on constitutional and state law grounds. Madison
Teachers, Inc:. v. Walker, No. l ICV3744 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Madison Coty. Sept. 14, 2012). Both decisions
have been appealed.
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bargaining protection than Wisconsin employees. Although Oklahoma
repealed its statute that mandated collective bargaining rights in mid-sized
municipalities, it allows collective bargaining at the option of the employer.
In contrast, Wisconsin prohibits collective bargaining even if the employer
is willing to engage in it.42 It is not surprising that Wisconsin Act 10
repealed the declarations in the Municipal and State Employee Relations
Acts that had found public employee collective bargaining to be in the
public interest. 43
Idaho limited negotiations for teachers to "compensation," which it
defined as salary and benefits, including insurance, leave time, and sick
leave. 44 Previously, bargaining subjects were determined by an agreement
between the parties. The Idaho enactment also limited collective bargaining
agreements to one fiscal year, July 1 through June 30, and prohibited
evergreen clauses or other provisions that allow a contract to continue until
a new one is reached. 45 However, Idaho voters rejected the enactment in a
referendum in November 2012. 46
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for teachers to
wages and salary and wage-related fringe benefits including insurance,
retirement benefits, and paid time off. 47 The statute permits collective
bargaining agreements to have grievance procedures, but deletes the prior
law's express authorization for a grievance procedure culminating in
binding arbitration. 48 The new statute prohibits bargaining on everything
else, including express prohibitions on bargaining about the school
calendar, teacher dismissal procedures and criteria, restructuring options,
and contracting with an educational entity that provides post-secondary
credits to students. 49 It also prohibits any contract that would place a school
district in a budgetary deficit50 and prohibits collective bargaining
agreements from extending beyond the end of the state budget biennium. 51
The new law repeals a prior provision that authorized parties to agree to
arbitrate teacher dismissals. 52
The Indiana enactment provides that the parties shall discuss
curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching

42. Wis. Act. IO§ 169(lm).
43. Id. § 261.
44. S.B.1108§ 17,6IstLeg.(ldaho2011).
45. Id§ 22.
46. IDAHO SEC'Y OF STATE, Election Day, Nov, 6, 2012 General Election Results, Proposition J,
www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/Results/2012/tot_stwd.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
4 7. Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 14, II 7th Geo. Assemb. (Ind. 2011 ).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.§
Id.§
Id.§
Id.§
52. Id.§

17.
15.
13.
16.
6.

--
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methods; hiring; evaluation; promotion; demotion; transfer; assignment;
retention; student discipline, expulsion, or supervision of students;
pupil/teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations; safety issues; and
hours. 53 However, any agreements reached in such discussions apparently
may not be included in the contract.
The Ohio enactment that was overturned in a voter referendum deemed
the following inappropriate for collective bargaining: health-care benefits;
restricting contracting out or providing severance pay to employees whose
jobs are contracted out; granting more than six weeks of vacation, more
than twelve holidays, or more than three personal days; employer
contributions to retirement systems; minimum staffing provisions, class
size, and restrictions on school district authority to assign personnel;
reductions in force of educational employees; and seniority as the sole
factor in reductions in force. 54
Michigan added to an existing lengthy list of prohibited subjects of
bargaining for educational personnel. Decision and impact bargaining are
now prohibited with respect to placement of teachers; reductions in force
and recalls; performance evaluation systems; the development, content,
standards, procedures, adoption, and implementation of a policy regarding
employee discharge or discipline; the format, timing, and number of
classroom visits; the development, content, standards, procedures, adoption,
and implementation of the method of employee compensation; decisions
about how an employee performance evaluation is used to determine
performance-based compensation; and the development, format, content,
and procedures of notice to parents and legal guardians of pupils taught by a
teacher who has been rated as ineffective. 55
At the behest of the Mayor of Chicago, Illinois made a surgical strike
against teacher collective bargaining in the Chicago Public Schools. It
amended the Educational Labor Relations Act to provide that, in the
Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and the length of the
school year are permissive, rather than mandatory, subjects ofbargaining, 56
thus empowering the Mayor through his appointed school board to
unilaterally lengthen the school day and school year.

53. Id.§ 18.
54. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4117.08(B)(4)
(contracting out); 4117.105(B) (severance pay to employees whose jobs have been contracted out);
4117.108(A)(l) (vacation); 4117.108(A)(2)-{3) (holiday and personal time); 4117.08(B)(3) (employer
contribution to the public employees retirement system); 4117 .08(B)(5) (staffing); 4117 .081(BX1)
(school district authority to assign); 41l7.08l(B)(3) (class size); 4117.08l(B)(4) (RIF·educational
employees); 306.04(B) (seniority-transit); 709.012 (seniority-firefighters); 3316.07(A)(l l) (senioritynonteaching school employees).
55. 2011 Mich. Pub. Act 103.
56. S.B. 7 § 10, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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Although much of the "tsunami" focused on eliminating employee
involvement in noneconomic workplace decision making, a number of
states focused on healthcare benefits. Although most law enforcement and
fire protection personnel were exempted from Wisconsin's prohibition on
bargaining for anything other than base wages, the state's regular biannual
budget act prohibited bargaining over law enforcement and firefighter
health insurance. 57 Ohio's enactment deemed "not appropriate" for
bargaining, inter alia, health-care benefits, except that the parties may agree
that the employer will pay up to eighty-five percent of the premiums. 58
New Jersey suspended bargaining over healthcare benefits for four
years while a new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding scale
according to salary of mandatory employee contributions to healthcare
premiums and provides for healthcare plans to be designed by two state
committees, one for education and one for the rest of the public sector. 59
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to make
changes in health insurance. The governing body may adopt changes in
accordance with estimated cost savings and proof of the savings. It gives
notice to each bargaining unit and a retiree representative. The retiree
representative and the bargaining unit representatives form a public
employee committee that negotiates with the employer for up to thirty days.
After thirty days, the matter is submitted to a tripartite committee, which,
within ten days, can approve the employer's proposed changes, reject them,
or remand for additional information. The committee's decision is finat. 60
These legislative initiatives replace worker voice with unilateral
employer control. Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker called for as much.
In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, he argued that such action would
give employers "the tools to reward productive workers and improve their
operations. Most crucially, our reforms confront the barriers of collective
bargaining that currently block innovation and reform. " 61
In contrast to Governor Walker's urgings, during the debates over the
Wisconsin legislation, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards
reported that many of its members were "gravely concerned" that the bill

57. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409cy.
58. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(8)(2),

(E).

59. 2011 N.J. Laws ch. 78.
60. 2011 Mass. Acts, ch. 69. Media reports suggested that in April when the Massachusetts House

passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama's Director of Intergovernmental Affairs telephoned
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick with concerns about the bill, which had been strongly opposed
by organized labor. The governor negotiated changes with labor leaders whose attitude changed from a
vow to fight the legislation ''to the bitter end" to support and congratulations to the governor for
"listening to labor's concerns." See Michael Levenson, Nalional Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law, Bos.
GLOBE, July 12, 2011.
61. Scott Walker, Op-Ed., Why I'm Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST.J., Mar. 10, 2011, at Al7.
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would "immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist
between school boards and teachers. "62 Hundreds of local government
officials signed an open letter to the governor opposing the bill on similar
grounds. 63 In Chicago, the school board's assertion of its newly acquired
right to unilaterally increase the length of the school day contributed to a
relationship with the teachers' union that an independent fact finder called
"toxic,''64 and led to a strike that closed the Chicago Public Schools for
seven school days. The view that replacing mandated worker voice with
unilateral employer control will result in improved public services is naive
at best. As discussed previously, the elimination of worker voice in most
decisions affecting public employees will likely redound to the detriment
not only of employees, but also the public.
Ill. THE NEW AITACK: PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
lNAPPROPRIATELY ADV ANT AGES PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN THE
BROADER POLITICAL PROCESS

I

The shift toward unilateral employer control shifts decision making
concerning public employees' compensation and working conditions from
the bargaining table to the broader political process. In this process, public
employee unions must compete against other interest groups. Although
Wellington and Winter regarded as a positive rationale for collective
bargaining rights in both the private and public sectors that such action
facilitates worker organization as a political force, 65 more recent attacks on
public sector collective bargaining regard worker organization as a political
force negatively.
For example, CCNY Professor Daniel DiSalvo contends that public
sector unions spend massively on political candidates and lobbying to
increase the demand for public services and maintain public employment at
He suggests, as an example, that political
unsustainable levels. 66
expenditures of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association led
to the building of more prisons and California's three strikes law,

62. Letter from John H. Ashley, Executive Director, Wisconsin Association of School Boards to
Hon. Alberta Darling and Hon, Robin Vos, Co-Chairs, Wisconsin Legislature Joint Committee on
Finance (Feb. IS, 2011) (on file with author).
63. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Budget Battle-Day 12 Many City Officials Think

Union Limits Go Too Far, MILWAUKEEJ. $ENTll'1EL, Feb. 27, 2001, available at 2011WLNR3854288.
64. Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union Local l, Am. Fedn of Teachers,
AFL-CIO, Arb. Ref 12.178 ar 56 (July 16, 2012) (Benn. Fact-Finder); see Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah &
Joel Hood, Arbi'trator Scolds CPS Teachers Union for Stubbornness as Threat of Strike Looms, Cm.
TRIB., July 18, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-18/news/ct-met-cps-fact-finder-report0718-20 120718_I_cps-teachers-teachers-union-school-day-and-year.
65. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8, 12.

66. Daniel Di.Salvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT'l AFFAIRS. Fall 20 I0, at I.
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mandating incarceration of individuals convicted for the third time of
certain felonies. 67 He argues that prohibiting agency-shop fees and dues
check-off "would let workers retain their right to negotiate with their
employers but put them on a level playing field in the political arena.''68
Similarly, Northwestern University Law Professors John McGinnis and
Max Schanzenbach argue, "Public employee unions, by virtue of the dues
they collect from members, possess war chests from which they can
contribute to politicians who support their goals. These goals, not
surprisingly, involve first and foremost accruing benefits for their members.
It is an axiom of political science that politicians tend to reward
concentrated groups at the expense of the public, because these groups can
in tum provide the most rewards to them."69 Unlike other interest groups,
McGinnis and Schanzenbach maintain, "public sector unions enjoy the
legal privilege of assessing dues from their members," something they label
"the coercive authority to collect dues" that provides "the legal
infrastructure to become particularly effective at wielding political

influence. "70
Not surprisingly, the tsunami that has hit public sector collective
bargaining has taken aim at union treasuries. Legislatures have taken steps
to preclude unions from assessing agency-shop or fair-share fees against
employees in the bargaining unit they represent who choose not to join the
union. Legislatures have also taken steps to make it more difficult for
unions to collect dues from those employees who voluntarily choose to join,
by prohibiting employers from agreeing to dues check-offs or restricting
such arrangements.
In 2012, amid much controversy, Indiana enacted a "right to work"
law which prohibited union security agreements in the private sector. 71 A
year earlier, amid much less controversy, Indiana prohibited such
agreements in public educationn Similarly, Wisconsin prohibited agency67. Id. at 11-12.
68.

DANIEL DISALVO, DUES AND DEEP POCKETS: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS' MONEY MACHINE 10

(Manhattan Institute Civic Report No.

67, Feb. 2012), available at http://www.manhattan-

institute.orgfpdti'cr_67 .pdf.
69. John 0. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions, 162
HOOVER INST. PoL'Y REV. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.hoover.org/publicationslpolicy-review/
article/43266.
70. Id.
71. H. Enrolled Act No. 1001, II 7th Gen. Assembly (Ind. 2012).

72. Prior to the 2011 enactment, the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a collective bargaining
agreement provision obligating teachers who were not members of the union to pay the union a fair
share fee, as long as failure to pay was not grounds for the nonpayer's dismissal. Ft. Wayne Educ.
Ass'n v. Goetz, 443 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The 2011 enactment prohibited bargaining over
all subjects, presumably including union security, except for wages and wage-related fringe benefits.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indiana has no statute conferring collective bargaining rights
on public employees outside of public education but municipalities may confer such rights on their
employees. See AFSCME v. City of Gary, 578 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). In 1990, Indiana
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shop or fair-share fee agreements for all public employees except exempted
public safety personnel. 73 Following the November 20I2 elections, the
lame duck Michigan Legislature enacted "right to work" laws for the
private 74 and public sectors. 75 The latter does not apply to police,
firefighters, or state troopers. 76
Wisconsin also prohibited voluntary dues check-off for all employees
except exempted public safety personnel. 77 As discussed infra, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin enjoined the
dues check-off prohibition as unconstitutional, but that decision was
reversed by a divided Seveth Circuit Court of Appeals. 78 Michigan
prohibited dues check-off for employees in public education. 79 It too has
been enjoined by a United States District Court. 80 The Tennessee
Collaborative Conferencing Act, which replaced its teacher collective
bargaining statute, permits dues check-off generally, but prohibits it for
political contributions. 81 California voters have three times rejected
initiatives that would have prohibited payroll deductions used for political
purposes, most recently in November 2012. 82 In 2009, the Supreme Court
upheld Idaho's prohibition on dues deduction for political expenditures
against constitutional attack. 83 The attacks on union security fees and dues
check off are considered in turn below.
A.

Union Security Fees

The law is clear that public employers and the unions representing
their employees may not require employees to join the union as a condition
of employment, but may require them to pay an agency-shop or fair-share
Governor Evan Bayh issued an executive order conferring collective bargaining rights on state
employees. Exec. Order 90-6 (Ind. 1990). Although Governor Mitch Daniels, on his first full day in
office in 2005 revoked the executive order, thereby eliminating collective bargaining for state
employees; see Steven Greenhouse, In Indiana, Clues to Future of Wisconsin Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2011; the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a fair share fee provision ofa collective bargaining
agreement negotiated under the Bayh executive order. Byrd v. AFSCME, 781 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003). By analogy to Byrd, with the absence of any statutory prohibition, it is arguable that union
security provisions in municipal collective bargaining agreements remain lawful in Indiana.
13. 2011 Wis. ACI 10 §§ 219, 276.
74. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 348 (Dec. l l, 2012).
15. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 349 (Dec. 11, 2012).
16. Id.§§ 14(4)(a)(i), (ii).
17. 2011 Wis. Act. 10 §§ 227, 298.
78. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), rev'd, Nos. 121854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013).
79. Mich. Pub. Act 53 (2012).
80. Bailey v. Callaghan. 193 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2820 (E.D. Mich. 2012), stay denied, 2012 WL
3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. l, 2012).
81. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-5-608(b)(6) (2011).
82. See Gene Cubbison & Lauren Steussy, Voters Reject Prop. 32 in California (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/locaVProposition-32-Results-Come-In- l 77 558611.html.
83. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
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fee representing their pro rata share of the costs of their representation. 84
The fee must be based on the percentage of union expenditures that went to
chargeable activities and the Court has undertaken an expenditure by
expenditure review of what the parties may constitutionally charge nonmember fee payers. 85 The First Amendment also requires that the parties
provide procedural protections against fee payers paying for nonchargeable
political or ideological expenditures. These procedures include advance
reductions from base dues and escrowing to ensure that nonmember
payments are not used even temporarily for political or ideological
purposes, notice to fee payers detailing how the percentage of dues
attributable to chargeable activity was calculated, and an opportunity for fee
payers to challenge the union's calculation of the fee and have their
challenges resolved by an independent decision maker. 86 Although the
Constitution does not require unions to reduce the fees charged to
nonmembers who voice no objection to being charged for political or
ideological expenditures, states are constitutionally free to limit unions to
charging fee payers only for chargeable expenditures unless the fee payer
affirmatively consents to paying for political or ideological activity. 87
Thus, agency-shop and fair-share fee provisions of collective
bargaining agreements cannot obligate nonmembers to subsidize union
political or ideological activity. However, when such union security
agreements are prohibited, the ability of union members to participate in the
broader political process is significantly reduced. This is because the union
remains obligated to represent nonmembers who are employed in the
bargaining unit. Thus, the dues paid by union members must be used to
subsidize the nonmembers, causing the union to divert resources that might
otherwise be used for political activity to fund the subsidy. Moreover, as
Mancur Olson demonstrated almost half a century ago in his classic work
The Logic of Collective Action, absent a union security fee provision in the
collective bargaining agreement, many workers who desire union
representation will make the economically rational decision not to join the
union and pay dues. This is because improved wages and working
conditions and most other goals sought by a union are, with respect to the
workers it represents, collective goods. They cannot be withheld from
workers in the bargaining unit who choose not to join the union. Absent a
union security agreement requiring those who choose not to join to pay a
service fee, economically rational workers will not join the union because
84. Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc.,431 U.S. 209 (1977).
85. See id.; see also Locke v. Karras, 555 U.S. 207 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500
U.S. 507 (1991).
86. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (I986).
87. Davenport v. Wash. Educ, Ass'n, 55 I U.S. 177 (2007).

2013]

EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

293

each worker will not perceptibly strengthen the union through his or her
membership alone and all workers will receive the benefits the union
achieves regardless of whether they join and pay dues. 88
In a more recent study, Greg Hundley found that where the law
permits an agency-shop fee, the probability of coverage by a collective
bargaining agreement increases for union members and for nonmembers,
but where the law mandates an agency-shop fee the probability overall for
coverage by a collective bargaining agreement increases but the probability
that those covered will be nonmembers is at its lowest compared to where
agency-shop fees are permitted or prohibited. The lowest rates of coverage
by collective bargaining agreements for union members and nonmembers
occur where the law does not allow agency shop. Hundley writes:
The very low rate of covered nonmembership under a mandatory
agency-shop law is consistent with the low marginal cost of membership
under such a law. But this does not explain why so many workers prefer
coverage, as the certain prospect of an agency fee should deter some
workers from seeking representation. It could be ... that workers are

more likely to engage in a collective activity when other members of the

group are required to contribute. 89

Hundley's findings and explanation are consistent with Olson's analysis.
The experience in the Nebraska public sector is also consistent with
Olson's analysis. Under a Nebraska statute, employees who are not
members of the union that represents them may choose their own
representatives in grievances or legal actions or pay the union for the costs
incurred in representing them. 9 Consequently, even though Nebraska is a
right-to-work state, teacher unions enjoy 100% membership because
teachers do not want to lose representation if they should need it
individually. 91
The Nebraska public sector notwithstanding, unions who serve as
exclusive bargaining representatives generally may not discriminate against
employees in the bargaining unit who are not members with respect to
representation. 92 Consequently, in the absence of an agency-shop or fairshare agreement, we can expect union membership to be considerably

°

88.

MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTrYE ACTION 76-91 (1965).

89. Greg Hundley, Collective Bargaining Coverage of Union Members and Nonmembers in the
Public Sector, 32 INDUS. REL. 72, 90 (1993).
90. NEB. REV. STAT.§ 48-838.
91. E-mail from Professor Steven Willborn, University of Nebraska, to Martin Malin (July 6,
2011).
92. For example, a union's duty of fair representation generally does not require it to provde a
lawyer to represent an employee in 3. grievance arbitration, see, e.g., Castelli v. Douglass Aircraft Co.,
752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985), but a union does breach its duty if it provides attorneys only to
union members. See id.; Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1981).
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lower, even among workers who desire union representation. This
magnifies the degree to which dues paid by members have to be diverted to
subsidize representation of nonmembers. To those who regard union
security arrangements as inappropriately advantaging unions in the political
process, this diversion is exactly what is intended. To the extent that union
security arrangements allow unions to avoid diverting dues paid by
members to fund representation of nonmembers, such arrangements do
advantage unions in the political process by enabling them to allocate
greater resources to political and ideological activity, but the case has not
been made that such advantage is inappropriate.
McGinnis and Schanzenbach 's claim that unions are privileged
because they have "the legal privilege of assessing dues from their
members," and "the coercive authority to collect dues" is simply false.
Unions' assessment of dues from their members is no different than that of
any other membership group. To become a member and to be entitled to
the rights and privileges of membership, an individual has to pay dues. The
consequence of a failure to pay dues is a loss of membership. A union's
authority to collect dues is no more or less coercive than that of any other
membership organization.
A union that has a union security agreement does have authority to
coerce the payment of agency-shop or fair-share fees, as opposed to dues.
But the strict limitations that the law places on those fees ensure that they
will not be used, even indirectly, for political or ideological purposes.
Thus, it cannot be said that unions are coercively gaining the ability to
advance their political agendas by using funds from individuals opposed to
those agendas. Individuals who object have the right to not be charged for
such political or ideological expenditures. Indeed, in the absence of union
security arrangements, unions labor under a disadvantage that is not
imposed on other membership groups as they are forced to divert members'
dues to subsidize services provided to nonmembers. As I have argued
elsewhere, the strongest constitutional justification for allowing agencyshop or fair-share fees is that such arrangements appropriately balance the
conflicting First Amendment rights of fee payers and union members. 93
Agency-shop and fair-share fee agreements result in more employees
becoming members of the union because the relatively small monetary
savings they would achieve by being fee payers is not worth the costs of
nonmembership, such as not having a right to vote for union officers and
being excluded from internal union events limited to members.
Consequently, the argument goes, even though unions cannot compel

93. Martin H. Malin, 11ie Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50
(1989).

OHIO

ST. L.J. 855
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employees to subsidize their ideological and political activities, allowing
agency-shop and fair-share fee arrangements enables unions to build their
treasuries for political purposes through dues paid by members who do not
necessarily support the union's political agenda. But members who
disagree with their unions' political or ideological expenditures retain the
option of terminating their memberships and becoming fee payers. Such a
right to opt out places them in a superior position to, for example, public
employees who contribute to retirement funds that invest those
contributions in stock of companies that make political or ideological
contributions from their general treasuries to which the employees object.
Those employees have no opt-out option,94 and the Supreme Court has held
that a desire to protect them from such expenditures does not
constitutionally justify restrictions on the companies' abilities to spend from
the general treasury on political campaigns. 95
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's rhetoric has grown increasingly
hostile to union security arrangements in the public sector, although its
legal doctrine has remained relatively stable. In Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 96 the Court held that public employers and the .unions
representing their employees may agree to require nonmembers in the
bargaining unit to pay the union a fee representing the nonmember's pro
rata share of the costs of representation with respect to wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment. The Court rejected the argument that
collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently political and
therefore employees who express their dissent by not joining the union may
not constitutionally be compelled to support the process financially. In so
doing, the court regarded union security issues in the public sector to be no
different from union security issues in the private sector:
The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining
simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment rights.
Even those commentators most acutely aware of the distinctive nature of

public-sector bargaining and most seriously concerned with its policy
implications agree that "[t]he union security issue in the public
sector . . . is fundamentally the same issue . . . as in the private
_sector . ... No special dimension results from the fact that a union
represents public rather than private employees. " 97

Unfortunately, the Court's decision in Abood injected an ambiguity
into the analysis, which did not exist in the private sector precedents on

94. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012).

95. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
96. 431U.S.209 (1977).
97. Id. at 232.

296

COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:277

which the Court relied. In Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 98 the
Court held that a union shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement
authorized by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) did not amount to enforced
ideological conformity on employees opposed to the union and therefore
did not violate the First Amendment. 99 It left open the question whether the
expenditure of employees' dues on political activities over the employees'
objections might violate the objectors' First Amendment rights. 100
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 101 the Court
answered the question it had left open in the affirmative. The Court
recognized that expenditure of objecting employees' dues on political
causes could violate the objectors' First Amendment rights of free
expression but avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting the RLA to
prohibit such expenditures. 102 In Abood, the Court squarely held that its
private sector precedents applied equally to the First Amendment issues
raised by an agency-shop provision in a public sector collective bargaining
agreement, but injected some ambiguity into the analysis. The Court wrote:
To compel employees financially to support their collectivebargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment
interests. An employee may very well have ideological objections to a
wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive

representative. His moral or religious views about the desirability of
abortion may not square with the union's policy in negotiating a medical

benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union policy of
negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the road to
serfdom for the working class, while another might have economic or
political objections to unionism itself. An employee might object to the
union's wage policy because it violates guidelines designed to limit
inflation, or might object to the union's seeking a clause in the
collective-bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. The

examples could be multiplied. To be required to help finance the union
as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to
interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the
judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the
important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations

established by Congress. 103

98. 351U.S.225 (1956).
99. Id. at 231.
100. Id.
IOI. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
102. Id. at 212-13.
103. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (footnote omitted). The Court has quoted this language in its
subsequent agency shop decisions. See, e.g., Locke, 555 U.S. at 212.
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I have argued that the above quoted language from Abood, when read
in context, need not and should not be read to reflect a rejection of
Hanson's basic premise that compelled financial support of the exclusive
bargaining representative does not in any way implicate objectors' First
Amendment rights, absent compelled financial support of political or
ideological expenditures. 104 But the language can be read to mean that any
compelled financial support of the exclusive representative infringes on
objectors' First Amendment rights of free association with such
infringement constitutionally justified with respect to compelled support of
expenditures germane to collective bargaining by the government's interest
in stable labor relations resulting from enabling the union to avoid free
riders, i.e., employees receiving the benefits of union representation without
paying for them. The Court's most recent jurisprudence in this area has
adopted this latter view of Abood, and has turned hostile toward union
security provisions in the public sector.
Thirty years after Abood, in upholding the constitutionality of the State
of Washington's requirement that nonmember fee payers affirmatively
consent to being charged for political and ideological activity before such
charges may be imposed, the Court in Davenport v. Washington Education
Association, characterized agency fee agreements as giving the union "the
power, in essence, to tax government employees . . . an extraordinary
power." 105 It further characterized the agency fee as "the union's
extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and spend other people's
money." 106 The Court distinguished the Washington statute's application to
public sector collective bargaining agreements from its application to
private sector collective bargaining agreements, observing that application
to the private sector "presents a somewhat different constitutional
question," but concluding that the private sector issue was not properly
before the Court. 107
The Court's hostility to union security provisions in public sector
collective bargaining agreements was magnified in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union Local !000. 108 In June 2005, Local 1000
sent its annual notice to nonmember fee payers for whom it served as
exclusive bargaining representative advising them of the percentage of dues
spent on activity related to collective bargaining, giving them thirty days to
object and advising them that if they failed to object they would be charged

104. Malin, supra note 93, at 858-61.
105. 551U.S.177, 184 (2007).
106. Id. at 187.
107. Id. at 190.
108. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
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full dues. 109 After the thirty-day objection window closed, Local 1000
imposed a special assessment to be used entirely to fund political
activity. 110 Fee payers who had objected during the thirty-day period to
paying full union dues were required to pay a percentage of the special
assessment equal to the percentage of regular dues they were being charged
but fee payers who had failed to object during the thirty-day window were
required to pay the full special assessment. 111 Both groups sued alleging
that the compelled payments were unconstitutional.
As litigated in the lower courts, the fee payers' lawsuit raised two
questions. With respect to the fee payers who had objected to being
charged full dues, the suit claimed that the union could rely on its prior
calculation to determine what percentage of the new assessment could be
charged to objectors. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, 112 but the
court did not expressly address the claim by the fee payers who had not
previously objected to paying full dues that, in light of the special
assessment, they were entitled to a new opportunity to opt to pay the
reduced amount. It appeared to combine that issue with the issue of
whether the special assessment impacted the continuing validity of the
original notice sent to all fee payers.
The Ninth Circuit regarded the entire case as governed by the Supreme
Court's decision in Chicago Teachers Union Local J v. Hudson, 113 which
mandated notice to fee payers of how the union calculated their fees, an
opportunity to object to the calculation and to have the objection resolved in
a reasonably prompt manner by a neutral adjudicator. Hudson, however,
could not control the question of whether fee payers who had not objected
to paying full dues following the first notice were entitled to a new
opportunity to object because the union in Hudson did not charge any fee
payers full dues regardless of objection. It charged a fee reduced by the
percentage of dues spent on political and ideological activity to all fee
payers and passed along to all fee payers the benefit of any further
reduction resulting from any fee payer's challenge to the union's
calculation. 114
Although the Court in Abood, adopted its RLA precedent that fee
payer dissent to union political and ideological expenditures is not to be
presumed but must be communicated to the union before fee payers become
109. Id. at 2285.
110. Id. at 2285-86.
111. Id. at 2286.
112. Knox v. Cal. State Employees Ass'n, 628 F.3d 1115, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom.
Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
113. 475 U.S. 292 (1986); see Knox, 628 F.3d at 1117 (describing the question presented as whether
Hudson required a new notice in light of the special assessment).
114. See Malin, supra note 93, at 881-82 (discussing this aspect of Hudson).
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constitutionally entitled to having their fees exclude those expenditures, 115
the Court found the requirement of communicating dissent satisfied by the
filing of a lawsuit, 116 but in Abood, the union had not instituted procedures
for fee payer objections. Knox thus raised the issue of whether a union
may, by instituting formal objection procedures, confine fee payers to a
thirty-day window for voicing their dissent. 117
In Knox, the Court majority went beyond the issues presented and held
not only that the fee payers were entitled to a new notice but that the special
assessment could only be imposed on those fee payers who affirmatively
indicated their consent to pay it. This rather extreme judicial activism was
criticized harshly by four members of the Court, 118 and has been similarly
criticized by labor law and constitutional law scholars. 119 The opinion
ratcheted up the hostile rhetoric previously displayed in Davenport.
Without acknowledging Abood's determination that "[t]he differences
between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not
translate into differences in First Amendment rights," 120 the Knox majority
rejected it. The Knox majority wrote, "Because a public-sector union takes
many positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political
and civic consequences, the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled
speech and association .... " 121 The Court added ominously, "[W]e do not
today revisit whether the Court's former cases have given adequate
recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake." 122 It
characterized authorizing union security fees to enable unions to avoid free
riders as "something of an anomaly" and an analysis "generally insufficient
to overcome First Amendment objections." 123
The Court thus signaled its receptivity to overruling Abood and
prohibiting agency-shop and fair-share fees in the public sector. It also
attacked the generally accepted principle that fee payer dissent to political
and ideological expenditures is not to be presumed, characterizing the
principle as an "offhand remark," that was "stated in passing" without
"consider[ing] the broader constitutional implications of an affirmative opt115. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236-37.
116. Id at 241 (following Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emp. v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 n.6 (1963). decided under the Railway labor Act).
117, I have urged that where unions have formal objection procedures they be allowed to insist that
fee payers use them but that they not be allowed to confine fee payers to a defined time period in which
to voice their dissent. Malin, supra note 93, at 881-83 & n.135.
118. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2297-98 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2306
(Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting).
119. See Catherine I. Fisk & Ewin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After
Know v. SEJU Local 1000 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
120. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
121. Knox,132S.Ct.at2289.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2289-90.
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out requirement." 124 The Court thus signaled that even if it does not
overrule Abood, it may prohibit charging fee payers for political and
ideological expenditures generally unless the fee payers affirmatively
consent to such charges. 125
The Court's more hostile characterization of union security in the
public sector is most unfortunate. Union security agreements are not the
extraordinary instruments that the Court suggests. For example, they are
clearly analogous to laws requiring attorneys licensed in a state to join the
state's unified bar association, 126 and student activity fees imposed by state
colleges and universities used to subsidize a variety of student
organizations. 127
In Knox, the Court supported its characterization of allowing unions to
prevent free riders by charging them fees as anomalous, quoting examples
from a Clyde Summers book review of Sheldon Leader's Freedom of
Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political Theory:
If a community association engages in a clean.up campaign or opposes
encroachments by industrial development, no one suggests that all
residents or property owners who benefit be required to contribute. If a
parent-teacher association raises money for the school library,
assessments are not levied on all parents. If an association of university
professors has as a major function bringing pressure on universities to
observe standards of tenure and academic freedom, most professors
would consider it an outrage to be required to join. If a medical
association lobbies against regulation of fees, not all doctors who share
in the benefits share in the costs. 128

The Court, however, omitted the sentences immediately preceding and
the sentence immediately following the quoted portion of the book review.
Those sentences state as follows (with the portion quoted by the Court
indicated by my ellipses):
The author fails to discuss a more general difficulty with the free rider
argument: Why is it not applicable to a wide range of private

124. Id. at 2290.
125. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 119. The prospect of the Court changing the law
governing public sector union security may soon be upon us. In Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.
2011 ), the plaintiffs alleged that the collective bargaining agreement between the State of Illinois and the
union representing home-care personal assistants in home-based Medicaid waiver programs
unconstitutionally required non-members to pay fair share fees. Although the plaintiffs sought to
characterize the assistants as independent entrepreneurs unconstitutionally compelled to support
financially a lobbying organization, the court analyzed the facts and concluded that the assistants were
employees of the state. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Normally,
we would expect the Court to reject a petition to review such a fact-based determination out of hand.
The Court, however, has asked the U.S. government for its views with respect to the petition. Harris v.
Quinn, No. 11-681,2012 WL2470091 (June29,2012).
126. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I (1990).
127. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
128. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (footnote and citation omitted).
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associations? ... The author, like most other advocates of the free rider

argument, never explains why the argument should be compelling when
applied to unions, but not other associations. 129

Contrary to what the Court apparently wished to convey, Summers
was not indicting union security fees but was critiquing the inadequacy of
Leader's defense. Summers went on to give the explanation that he
considered superior to Leader's:
The tolerance of free riders is one of the hallmarks of a free market
system and an inescapable condition in any complex democratic social

system. I would suggest that the appeal to the free rider argument on
behalf of unions has more to do with the special role unions play in our
society than with conceptions of freedom of association, and the
author's conceptual approach simply cannot explain why unions are, or

should be, treated differently. 130
The special role that unions play in society accounts for our labor laws
conferring on them the status of exclusive representative. As such, they are
unlike, for example, the parent-teacher association that raises money for the
school library which has no legal obligation to divert members' dues that it
might otherwise spend on political activity to represent nonmember parents
who claim that their children were denied library privileges. In contrast, the
union that negotiates for additional personal days is legally obligated to
represent nonmember employees who claim they were denied personal days
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, even though the cost of
such representation may divert members' dues from funding political
activities that the union has a First Amendment right to fund.
Despite the Court's characterization of agency fees in Davenport, a
public employer's agreement with a union to include an agency fee
provision in their collective bargaining agreement cannot accurately be
described as conferring on the union the power to tax employees. The
power of taxation is a power of sovereignty, whereas the union security
arrangement is the result of a broader contract between the public employer
and the union. In other words, a unit of government agrees to union
security in its capacity as an employer rather than in its capacity as
sovereign. The Court has long recognized that the Constitution affords
government greater flexibility when it acts as employer than when it acts as
sovereign.13 1
Union security agreements serve the same labor relations purposes in
the public sector as they do in the private sector. They do not privilege
unions to use the money of those opposed to their political agendas to
129. Clyde Summers, Book Review, 16 COMP. LAB. LJ. 262, 268 (1995).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Enquist v. Ore. Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myeis, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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finance their political activities. They cannot be said to inappropriately
advantage unions in the broader political process.
B.

Dues Check-Off

Payment of union dues by payroll deduction generally requires written
authorization from the employee. 132 Consequently, dues check-off cannot
be thought of as coercive; that most members authorize it as a convenient
method of payment does not defeat its voluntary nature. Prohibitions on
dues check-off, however, can have a devastating effect on union ability to
represent employees. For example, New York's Taylor Law prohibits
strikes by public employees in that state. 133 One penalty against a union for
engaging in an illegal strike is suspension of the union's dues check-off. 134
When the United Federation of Teachers engaged in an illegal strike against
the New York City Public Schools from September 9 through September
16, 1976, the New York Public Employment Relations Board (NYPERB)
suspended its dues check-off. Litigation over the penalty delayed its
imposition until May I, 1982. In the first three months of the suspension,
the union's revenue from dues and agency-shop fees dropped by $1.3
million and when the cost of dues and fee collection was considered, it had
lost $2 million. Finding that the loss in income impaired the union's ability
to provide necessary representational services, the NYPERB restored the
dues check-off. 135
The district court's decision in Wisconsin Education Association
Council v. Walker enjoining the prohibition on dues check-off in Wisconsin
illustrates the absence of any principled basis for such action. 136 Wisconsin
Act 10, among other provisions, prohibited employers from allowing union
members to pay their dues by payroll deduction. The act divided public
employees into general public employees and public safety employees.
Public safety employees were defined as police officers, firefighters, deputy
sheriffs, county traffic police officers, village police officers and

132. Some states mandate payroll deduction of agency-shop or fair-share fees. See, e.g., 5 ILL
COMP. STAT. 31S/6(e) (Supp. 2012); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. Sill (2006); 34 N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 13A-5.S,
13A-5.6 (West 2006). To the extent that payroll deduction is mandated by state statute, it may be
thought of as coercive but as developed above, it only coerces payment of the fee payer's pro rata share
of the costs of representation in collective bargaining; it does not coerce financial support of the union's

political and ideological activities.
133. N.Y. CIV. SERV. Art. 14, § 210.
134. Id.

135. United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, NYSUT, AFT, 15 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 'i 3091 (1982). For
additional examples of the devastating financial impact loss of dues check-off can have, see Ann C.
Hodges, Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public Sector Bargaining Retrenchment, 16 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 599 (2012).
136. 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), rev'd, Nos. 12-1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan.

18, 2013).
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firefighters, state troopers, and state motor vehicle inspectors. The act
prohibited dues check-off for general employees but allowed it for public
safety employees. 137
The record reflected that the unions who represented the Milwaukee
police and Milwaukee firefighters, the West Allis Professional Police
Association, the Wisconsin Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association and
the Wisconsin Troopers Association (representing troopers and motor
vehicle inspectors) all had endorsed Scott Walker for governor in the 2010
campaign. In contrast, the unions representing other law enforcement and
fire service employees, such as the Wisconsin Capitol Police, the University
of Wisconsin Campus Police, state correctional officers, probation and
parole officers, conservation wardens, fire crash rescue specialists, and state
criminal investigation agents and the unions representing most other public
employees in the state endorsed Governor Walker's opponent. 138 In other
words, Act 10 essentially prohibited dues check-off in bargaining units
whose employees were represented by unions that had opposed Governor
Walker's election and allowed it in bargaining units whose employees were
represented by unions that had supported the governor.
The district court found that Act !O's distinction between general and
public safety employees for purposes of allowing or prohibiting dues checkoff lacked any rational basis and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 The court also found that it
violated the First Amendment. The court distinguished Ysursa v. Pocatello
Education Association, 140 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Idaho's prohibition on any check-off of monies to be used for political
purposes on the ground that the Wisconsin enactment did not apply across
the board but instead discriminated on the basis of speaker viewpoint.
The fact that none of the public employee unions falling into the
general category endorsed Walker in the 2010 election and that all of the
unions that endorsed Walker fall within the public safety category
certainly suggests that unions representing general employees have
different viewpoints than those of the unions representing public safety
employees. Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidence
ofrecord strongly suggests that the exemption of those unions from Act
!O's prohibition on automatic dues deductions enhances the ability of
unions representing public safety employees to continue to support this
Governor and his party. 141

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 859.
Id. at 864-<i5.
Id. at 876.
555 U.S. 353 (2009).

141. Wisc. Educ. Ass'n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 873. The court also quoted Wisconsin State
Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald's comments that Act 10 would deny funds to President
Obama's reelection campaign. Id. at 875 & n.17. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Nos. 12·
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Similarly, in United Food and Commercial Workers v. Brewer, 142 the
court issued a preliminary injunction against the Protect Arizona
Employees' Paychecks from Politics Act, which required unions whose
members paid their dues by payroll deduction to certify that they did not
use dues for political purposes or to specify the percentage of dues that they
would use for political purposes. Payroll deduction of the percentage
specified was prohibited unless the individual employee affirmatively
consented to such deduction on an annual basis. These restrictions did not
apply to unions representing public safety employees or to other groups
who received money by payroll deduction, such as retirement plan
administrators, charitable organizations, and insurance companies. 143 The
court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff unions were
likely to succeed on the merits because the act unconstitutionally
discriminated based on speaker viewpoint. 144
The academic attack on dues check-off is as unprincipled as the
legislative attack. McGinnis and Schanzenbach decry union political
spending opposing privatization, supporting teacher tenure, and supporting
increases in government services. 145 DiSalvo decries union support of
Democratic candidates, efforts to recall Governor Walker and Republican
state senators in Wisconsin, and the successful referendum overturning the
Ohio statute that would have significantly curtailed public employee
collective bargaining rights. 146 He complains that "two of the top five
biggest spenders in Wisconsin's 2003 and 2004 state elections were the
Wisconsin Education Association Council and the AFSCME-affiliated
Wisconsin PEOPLE Conference. Only the state Republican Party and two
other political action committees-those belonging to the National
Association of Realtors and SBC/Ameritech-spent more." 147
Despite DiSalvo's assertions to the contrary, prohibitions on union
security arrangements and dues check-offs do not level the political playing

1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012). The majority did not dispute the facts as found by
the district court and detailed above. The majority, however, concluded that the facts, as a matter of law,
did not establish discrimination based on viewpoint, noting, for ex.ample, that the category of public
safety employees included municipal police and firefighter bargaining units represented by unions that
had endorsed Governor Walker's opponent, slip. op. at 22, discounting the statement by Senate Majority
Leader Fitzgerald as not necessarily reflective of the intentions of the legislature as a whole, id. at 25,
and characterizing dues check-off as a governmental subsidy of speech and opining that governments
may discriminate when they subsidize speech. Id. at 10-13.

142. 817 F. Supp. Zd 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011).
143. Id. at 1121-22.
144. Id. at 1124-27; see also Bailey v. Callaghan, 193 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2820 (E.D. Mich. 2012),
stay denied, 2012 WL 3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2012) (preliminarily enjoining Michigan statute
prohibiting dues check-off for public education employees).
145. McGinnis & Schanzenbach, supra note 69.
146. DISALVO, supra note 6&, at 3-5.
14 7. DiSalvo, supra note 66, at 11.
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field. Rather, they clear the field so that the only major spenders on
political activity are entities such as the Wisconsin Republican Party, the
National Association of Realtors, and SBC/Ameritech (now AT&T).
Wellington and Winter regarded the organization of workers into an
effective political voice as one of the positive justifications for collective
bargaining in both the private and public sectors. 148 The decades of
experience since their classic work was published bear this out. To the
extent that public sector collective bargaining furthers unions as an effective
voice that counters business and commercial interests in the public debate,
it furthers, rather than distorts, democracy.

N.

CONCLUSION

Public sector collective bargaining is said to distort democracy in two
ways. First, it allegedly excludes competing voices from public decisionmaking. Second, it allegedly inappropriately advantages public employee
unions in the broader political process.
The first concern has led to the narrowing of the scope of bargaining in
the public sector. This is the wrong road to travel. Rather than replace
collective bargaining with unilateral employer control, we should break
away from the private-sector model and develop creative approaches to
mandate employee voice in a broad array of matters that affect them which
will not freeze out other voices.
The second concern has led to prohibitions on agency-shop and fairshare fees and to prohibitions or restrictions on dues check-off. These
measures lack any principled basis and derive from their proponents'
dislike of the political positions taken by public sector unions. Rather than
distort democracy, to the extent that public employee collective bargaining
facilitates the organization of workers and amplifies their voices in the
political arena, it furthers the democratic process by balancing business,
commercial, and similar interests.

148. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8-9, 12.

